The two competitive currents in French philosophy initiated by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze tackle the difference between empiricism and idealism in contrary motion. In Derrida, the move is toward a critique of representation. In Deleuze, it is toward recovery of the real. Never theless, this paper nominates their meeting in a kind of 'radical empiricism'. Both Derrida and Deleuze engage with empiricism at certain points in their work, although many who go by that label would be surprised to hear it. KEYWORDS: Derrida, Deleuze, Hume, Freud, empiricism
The two competitive currents in French philosophy initiated by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze tackle this difference in contrary motion. In Derrida, the move is toward a critique of representation. In Deleuze, it is toward recovery of the real. Nevertheless, this paper nominates their meeting in a kind of 'radical empiricism'. Both Derrida and Deleuze engage with empiricism at certain points in their work, although many others who go by that label would be surprised to hear it.
The sense in which the two can be said to be responsive to the aspirations of a certain empiricism is related to the sense in which they also display affini- This intuition, of a difference the mind itself draws from the experience of repetition, inaugurates, in Deleuze's reading of Hume, the principles of association, which will form the subject as a thinking subject. In the introduction to Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze remarks of a conventional reading of Hume that;
The point of view of the origin, according which every idea derives from a pre-existing impression and represents it, does not have the importance that people attribute to it: it merely gives the mind a simple origin and frees the ideas from the obligation of having to represent things . . . The essence and destiny of empiricism are not tied to the atom but rather to the essence of associations; therefore, empiricism does not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject.
2
It is empiricist of Hume to insist, not on the veracity of an apparent world gleaned through the senses, but on a forming of the operations of thought as a matter of practice in every case. That is, experience lies outside and as a precondition to reason; the rational does not dictate to thought, rather the mind's affections are the material from which its rationality and consciousness are fashioned.
This makes Hume's philosophy "a sharp critique of representation," and "subjectivity is determined as an effect" Deleuze writes. 3 Hume is a critique of later philosophy in which rationalism has transferred mental determinations to external objects, taking away thereby from philosophy the meaning and intelligibility of practice and the subject. Sometimes, these factors are the body and matter, in which case psychology makes room for physiology. Sometimes they are particular principles
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constituting a psychic equivalent of matter, wherein psychology finds its unique, possible object and its scientific condition. Hume, with his principles of association, has chosen the latter route, which is the most difficult and the most audacious. This is where his sympathy for materialism comes from, and at the same time his reticence toward it. 6 A sympathy for materialism, since it allows for the impressions of experience to be infinitely varied according to practice and without being confined in advanced to any particular law; yet a reticence, since this mental material is also always formed in some sense. Formation is the question that the principles of association are designed to answer. As Deleuze remarks elsewhere, To meet a suspicion that the story of the death drive is a little far-fetched,
Freud reassures us:
This is merely due to our being obliged to operate with the scientific terms, that is to say, with the figurative language, peculiar to psychology . . . We could not otherwise describe the processes in question at all, and indeed we could not have become aware of them. 8 This remarkable comment hints at a radically different view of the relationship between scientific writing and observation than the positivist one with which he is often credited. Here Freud not only recognises that the observation relies on a pre-existing lexicon to 'describe the processes in question' -this lexicon being the notable innovation of psychoanalysis. But more, it is only through the fabrication of the theoretical terms of the science that these observations themselves become apparent. It is as though having invented the terms sharpens observation and allows for their discernment. 9 Freud then refers to the hope he cherished, from the Project for a Scientific Psychology, for a 'hard science' account of nervous illness. This hope is still very much alive, as cognitive science today grapples with whether electrochemical descriptions of brain states would add anything to consciousness of them.
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The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we were already in a position to replace the psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones. It is true that they, too, are only part of a figurative language; but it is one with which we have long been familiar and which is perhaps a simpler one as well. 10 Elsewhere, Freud has addressed the criticism of the indirectness of psychoanalytic observations -that these processes of repression and instinctual vicissitudes and so on, are known only through symptoms and by report.
This has been a difficulty for psychoanalysis and its claims to scientific status from early on. Freud answers it in the New Introductory Lectures, for example, by drawing attention to other sciences whose evidence is similarly indirect -astronomy, geology, and so on. 11 We might add to this the contemporary observations of particle physics and molecular biology, whose pro- This sensitivity to genre is present throughout Freud's work, for the analysis is always of an expression which is subject to competing needs of representation -repression, desire, and so on -and the 'genre' is always a matter of circumstantial fact. The symptom, for example, might be hysterical or it might be obsessive-compulsive; these are texts belonging to separate genres, and the resulting 'representation' looks very different in each -one is paralysed, the other cannot resist repeating a gesture -and yet reading their terms and logical relations according to psychoanalysis, they may yield analogous ideas.
This connection between the idea and its expression also raises the problem of empiricism. It is not that analysis is 'mere interpretation', just as philosophy cannot be 'truth itself' -only the naive realist imagines that, through empirical means, things are 'represented as they really are'. The work of the dream is conditioned by condensation and displacement of the dream-thoughts underlying it, but there is also "a third factor whose share in the transformation of the dream-thoughts into the dream-content is not to be underrated:
namely, considerations of representability in the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use . . ." represented.
An empiricism that Freud and Hume seem to share allows for the contradiction that is the subject; that it is a circumstantial collection of the given, but that it is also the transcendence of the given, in that which makes of the collection something systematic. The principles of association are necessarily transcendent, and cannot represent experience of ideas. They represent experience of the relations perceived between ideas, which nevertheless occur as a kind of experience in the subject.
This subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the given in such a way that it makes the given itself a synthesis and a system. This is what we must explain. In this formulation of the problem, we discover the absolute essence of empiricism.
14 How are we to understand the empirical, on this view? Deleuze asks:
But what is the given? It is, says Hume, the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions . . . Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. 15 Deleuze, extending his earlier correction of misreadings of Hume, distils empiricism as fundamentally the principle of difference: "not that 'every idea derives from an impression' . . . but rather that 'everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different'".
[And] "we must begin with this experience because it is the experience."
16
The empirical is the encounter between thought and the real. It is never free of the subject, but on the contrary is the only expression possible of the subject, and is its best expression, too. This empiricism is also a materialism because it amounts to specifying that ideas are substance -in as much as the term has utility -since perceptions are the substances of which we have experience. Matter is not outside the mental, nor is there a noumenal world of greater substance than our thought. Empiricism dispenses with this nostalgia, which is really a gesture toward a difference that lies on the other side of the concept of distinction.
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Ideas then are given in their difference, and the subject constitutes itself in the given, by virtue of principles which are given in another way, as tendencies of the collection itself to associate between separable moments.
Relations, for empiricism, are external to ideas. "When James calls himself a pluralist, he does not say, in principle, anything else. This is also the case when Russell calls himself a realist. We see in this statement the point common to all empiricisms." 17 But if the relations must come from outside the particular ideas they associate, then there can only ever be a circumstantial explanation of any relation; it will never be necessary. If it is true that association is necessary in order to make all relations in gen- This 'idealism' is "a whole system of projections, of reductions, in analytic theory and practice . . . The Oedipus complex is basically an apparatus for repressing desiring machines, and is in no sense a formation of the unconscious itself." 22 The Oedipus complex appears to schizoanalysis as itself a form of secondary revision, in a theory that acts unconsciously. 23 
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Derrida, too, is quick to declare a resistance to psychoanalysis in its institutional settings. 24 At the same time, in an epilogue to his early paper "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida considers the influence of psychoanalysis on deconstruction, and calls for the Freudian concept of the trace to be 'radicalised and extracted' from the metaphysics of presence, since it is the trace which makes possible the concept of an unconscious. The labour of the argument is to unveil, nevertheless, "all the differences which furrow Freudian conceptuality," and which bring presentation, writing, trace, repression, pleasure, reality, consciousness, death drive, even psyche, to the brink of the non-concept, in the vicinity of différance.
27
The main argument concludes that through Freud's rhetorical procedure, something is 'spoken without being said, that is, is represented.' Importantly, it is the concept of writing that is mobilised here to that effect. " [S] tarting with the Traumdeteung (1900), the metaphor of writing will appropriate simultaneously the problems of the psychic apparatus in its structure and that of the psychic text in its fabric."
28
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Freud brings into the ambit of a scientific psychology the modern problematic which will develop into 'structuralism' in the following century -we need to give to Freud that originality at the same time as that myopia, as Derrida notes when he reflects on the immense labour of deconstruction that is required in regarding "the metaphysical complications of psychoanalysis and the so- Derrida often works with models that imagine this harbouring, as part of his analysis of the structures of aporia in thought, including Freud's own. Writing is both a subject of analysis for Derrida -especially the writing of philosophy -and is also an example of a particular configuration that Derrida addresses throughout the problems he tackles. This configuration has the structure of aporia; that is, it represents a sort of impossibility. The aporetic Derrida aptly describes as an experience.
What if the exoteric aporia therefore remained in a certain way irreducible, calling for an endurance, or shall we rather say an experience other than that consisting in opposing, from both sides of an indivisible line, an other concept . . .
36
To counter the criticism of deconstruction that it is essentially negative, and offers nothing to the problems it analyses, Derrida seeks to bring into focus the affirming possibilities of the aporia, without turning to a mysticism that reverts to a theological style of thought. 37 Freud The 'mythopoetical virtue of bricolage' is that it abandons pretensions to a centre as a 'critical search for a new status of discourse'. "In opposition to 'epistemic' discourse, structural discourse on myths -'mythological' discourse -must itself be 'mythomorphic'. It must have the form of that of which it speaks." logical requirement which permits us to distinguish between several qualities of discourse on myth?" 41 This question cannot be answered properly, Derrida tells us, until the rhetorical difference between theory and myth is posed explicitly as a philosophical problem. Significantly, until it is so posed, the discourse will seem only as though it is faulty philosophy.
I have said that empiricism is the matrix of all faults menacing a discourse which continues, as with Lévi-Strauss in particular, to consider itself scientific. If we wanted to pose the problem of empiricism and bricolage in depth, we would probably end up very quickly with a number of absolutely contradictory propositions concerning the status of discourse in structural ethnology. On the one hand, structuralism justifiably claims to be the critique of empiricism. But at the same time there is not a single book or study by
Levi-Strauss which is not proposed as an empirical essay which can always be completed or invalidated by new information. 42 Derrida finds that theoretical writing, and particularly, the social sciences as the form of theoretical writing most intensely caught in this contradiction, cannot reconcile the tension between these two views of signification:
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism . . .
43
These are "absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy," and it is in the oscillation of this ambivalence that a knowing science must find its 'empirical'. 44 But to pose the problem of the difference between theory and myth philosophically, will require an understanding not just of writing, but also of the rationality to which theory is pinned.
Conclusion
The work of Derrida and Deleuze shows in different ways that it is empiricism that raises the demanding question of signification: what are the terms of my observation?
An empiricism to which both Hume and Freud can be read as acceding requires that, if it is possible to describe the representation of thought, and to detail the constitution of the subject, it is nevertheless impossible to specify it in advance of the encounters that make thought of experience, and thus constitute its subject. And experiencing the given will always exceed the forms given to it -differences are infinitely varied and arise in the wake of its expression, as well as in the penumbra of circumstances which gave rise to it. As Deleuze explores it:
Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, not a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as an Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed 'heres' and 'nows'.
Only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed things, but things in their free and wild state, beyond anthropological predicates. 45 In its vulgar variety as the simple revealing of reality -the 'scientific facts' with which we are bombarded -empiricism is caught in an aporia which guarantees the reproduction of certain vital and unconscious myths. And in its more enigmatic version, as a philosophy of differences, the question is answered only circumstantially, as a theoretical event that knows no guarantee.
Structuralism is said to have the better of the question of signification, since it recognises the role of difference in the interpretability of any structure of signs. This is the sense that Derrida alludes to when he says structuralism is 'justifiably' held to be the critique of empiricism. But on Deleuze's reading, empiricism lets in the real difference; that is, the new, shocking and illegible differences lying outside the comprehensibility of the structure constituted by differences appearing in their Hegelian negativity. The transcendental, which is the problem of subjectivity on Deleuze's reading of Hume, remains a paradox, just as the empirical, following Derrida's reading of Lévi-Strauss, becomes an aporia.
There can be a lyric sense of the empirical, all the same. Writes Derrida, ". . . the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation." 46 Writes
Deleuze, "I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving hori-278 Robyn Ferrell zon, from an always decentred centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them." 47 It is towards this empiricism as a rhetorical event that Deleuze and Derrida, differently, and with reticence or even trepidation, might all the same be seen to urge us.
